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I. INTRODUCTION
“Fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent . . . .”1 
In recognition of this fact, Congress enacted Title VII, which makes it
unlawful for an employer to retaliate against any employee for opposing 
employer actions that they reasonably believe to be motivated by 
discrimination.2 
In 2013, the Supreme Court in University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar declared that an employee alleging retaliation 
must prove that the employer’s motive to retaliate against an employee
constituted a “but-for” cause of the adverse action by the employer,3 
noting with disapproval that “claims of retaliation are being made with
ever-increasing frequency.”4 As lower courts have shifted to the more 
stringent but-for causation requirement, they have struggled to reconcile 
the Nassar decision with application of the pervasive burden shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.5 In particular, 
circuit courts have had to determine how Nassar affects a plaintiff’s burden 
of proving a prima facie case of retaliation. The circuit courts that have 
addressed this question are currently split between finding that plaintiffs 
need only establish a weak inference of discrimination at the initial prima
facie stage of their case or that plaintiffs must already establish that 
retaliation was a but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action.6 
1.  Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 279
(2009) (quoting Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005)). This 
phenomenon of silence in the face of injustice has most recently been thrust into the public
eye in the form of the #MeToo movement. See Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & 
Haley Sweetland Edwards, Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), 
http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/N8JC-UPB2].  
When asked why they remained silent until now, the majority of sexual harassment victims
expressed a crushing fear of what would happen to them personally, to their families, or 
to their jobs if they spoke up. Id.
2.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 257, tit. 7, § 704(a)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018)). 
3.  133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–34 (2013). 
 4.  Id. at 2531. The percentage of retaliation claims has more than doubled since
1998 to the extent that retaliation is now the most frequently alleged basis of
discrimination. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFO. & PLANNING, Charge Statistics (Charges 
Filed with EEOC): FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/AJ2M-YYN9].
In 2015, retaliation claims made up 44.5% of all charges received by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and 35.7% of those claims were Title VII charges.  
Id.
 5.  See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). McDonnell Douglas has been cited more frequently 
than any other decision in employment discrimination law. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 40 (4th ed. 2017). 
6.  For a collection of relevant cases, see Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 
243, 251 n.10 (4th Cir. 2015). 
938
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This Comment examines the application of but-for causation in Title 
VII retaliation claims post-Nassar. Following a brief look into the
traditional requirements of a plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, Part II 
assesses the holding in Nassar and surveys various courts of appeal holdings 
in its wake. After examining policy considerations and arguments put 
forward for each position in Part III, this Comment clarifies the misperception 
that the McDonnell Douglas framework necessarily proves but-for causation. 
In Part IV, this Comment proposes that the Supreme Court should rectify the
split by acknowledging that but-for causation need only be proven at the
ultimate stage of a retaliation case and that, under such a requirement, only a 
strong version of the McDonnell Douglas framework will maintain its
efficacy. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, making it an
“unlawful employment practice [to] discriminate against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”7 
Recognizing that protecting employees from retaliation for enforcing their 
rights is fundamental to ensuring a workplace free of discrimination, Title 
VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee 
because they have opposed or complained of unlawful discriminatory
conduct.8 
7.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a general anti-
discrimination statute originally called for by President John F. Kennedy to give all 
Americans the right to be served in facilities that are open to the public and provide greater
protection for the right to vote.  JOHN F. KENNEDY, Radio and Television Address on Civil
Rights, in PAPERS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY: PRESIDENT’S OFFICE FILES 1, 1–2 (1963), 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-045-005.aspx [https://perma.cc/
M92B-4RZ6]. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII in particular, see 
generally Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011). 
 8.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Importantly, it is not necessary for plaintiffs to be 
successful in their underlying discrimination allegations.  See Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 
F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (“If the availability of that protection were to turn on whether
the employee’s charge[s] were ultimately found to be meritorious, resort to the remedies
provided by the Act would be severely chilled.” (quoting Sias v. City Demonstration 
Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978))).  Retaliation cases can be an easy sell to 
juries—the story that an employee’s boss got angry and fired her because she complained 
is one that everyone knows and can find plausible.  Thus, a jury is not required to believe 
the boss is actually racist or sexist, just human. 
939





   
     
   
 
 
    
    
   
  
 
           
    
     
    
  
     
       
     
   
      
   
  
       
        
         
   
   
          
       
      
     
      
    
       
      
      
   
     
        
    
    
 
A. McDonnell Douglas Framework 
When alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII’s § 2000-e(3)(a), 
plaintiffs may prove the violation either through direct evidence of 
retaliatory purpose9 or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework.10 To prevail under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing the following: 
(1) “she engaged in protected activity”; (2) “her employer took adverse 
action against her”; and (3) “a causal relationship existed between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment activity.”11 The plaintiff must 
prove each element of the prima facie retaliation case by a preponderance of
the evidence.12 Once plaintiffs so prove, defendants then bear a burden of 
producing admissible evidence that shows they had “a legitimate, non-
9.  Direct evidence of retaliatory purpose could take several forms, including an
email displaying unlawful discriminatory conduct or a production manager saying he 
would not promote a female employee to the “washman” position because if he did “every 
woman in the plant would want to go into the washroom.” Bell v. Birmingham Linen 
Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983). 
10. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).  The Court 
described Title VII’s goal to eliminate discrimination while preserving workplace efficiency as
follows: “The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is
efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and . . . neutral employment 
and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear
that Title VII tolerates no . . . discrimination, subtle or otherwise.” Id. at 801. The burden-
shifting framework developed in McDonnell Douglas was implemented to  get  at such  
“subtle” forms of discrimination. Id. 
11. Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (quoting Price v. Thompson, 280 F.3d 209, 212 (4th 
Cir. 2004)). For a thorough analysis of what constitutes materially adverse conduct, see 
JENNY R. YANG. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.004, EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON RETALIATION AND RELATED ISSUES, at 33–41 (2016). 
12. John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti,
30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 544 (2007). Part of the root of this dispute is the fact that
“causal relationship” language is embedded in the language of the retaliation prima facie
case, but not in the status-based prima facie case. Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (quoting Price, 
280 F.3d at 212). In establishing the framework, the Court addressed a status-based racial
discrimination claim wherein they held that a prima facie case is established
by showing (i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that [the
plaintiff] applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (iii) that, despite [the plaintiff’s] qualifications, [the plaintiff] was
rejected; and (iv) that, after [the plaintiff’s] rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications. 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Courts have been clear that this is not proof of the 
ultimate fact of causation. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
254 (1981).  The use of the word “causal” in the third prong of the retaliation prima facie
requirement has led some circuits to improperly require proof of causation at this 
preliminary stage. See infra Section II.C.1. 
940
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retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”13  The defendant’s
burden of production is light and only needs to raise a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner against 
the plaintiff.14 If the defendant meets its burden of production, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s purported non-
retaliatory reasons “were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.”15 
Many writers, and some courts, have misleadingly used the term 
“pretext” to refer to the entire final stage of the framework.16  This  is  
incorrect, as it implies that a plaintiff may win a case at this stage only by
proving the defendant’s reasons are pretextual. In actuality, there are two 
ways a plaintiff can move forward at the third stage, only one of which
implicates pretext. The plaintiff can proceed either by (1) showing 
the defendant’s tendered reason is “unworthy of credence”—the pretext 
method—or by (2) proving discrimination was the actual reason using 
some method of proof other than the pretext method.17 
Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must
prove causation at two distinct junctures: (1) the initial causal connection
required at the prima facie stage, and (2) the final stage of the framework 
13. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1996)). However, this burden is not 
conclusive; a jury may, but need not, find retaliatory intent if a defendant fails to meet this 
burden.  See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
14. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55. 
15. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).  The Supreme Court created this three-step framework to make it
possible to ferret out meritorious discrimination claims, which are notoriously difficult to
establish. See infra Section II.A.1. 
16. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of
Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83,
85 (2004); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy
of the “Pretext-Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 
65–66 (1991); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,
93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2234 (1995). Pretext, as a method of proof, is best conceptualized
as a chain of permissive inferences.  See infra Section III.A.
17. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense 
of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate 
Treatment Under Title VII, 87CAL.L. REV.983, 984–85, 988 (1999) (noting there are two ways 
to proceed at the third stage). The most common alternatives to proving pretext at this stage
are direct evidence, comparative evidence, and statistics. See infra Section II.A.1.
941
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where liability is ultimately determined.18 Through this mechanism, a
plaintiff without direct evidence of retaliation can still prevail because a
jury is allowed to infer a hidden retaliatory purpose.19 
It is important to recognize that the causal requirement needed to  
establish a prima facie retaliation claim is “less onerous” than the causal 
requirement needed to prove pretext.20 If the defendant successfully 
rebuts the presumption of retaliation and the plaintiff retains the burden of 
persuasion, the “burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”21  To
do so, the plaintiff may show the defendant’s explanation was merely
pretextual by showing “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination 
was the real reason.”22 Alternatively, the plaintiff may use a method of
proof other than the pretext method.23 
1.  Addressing the Criticisms of McDonnell Douglas
While initially formulated as a helping hand to disparate treatment plaintiffs, 
McDonnell Douglas has been demonized over the years as being ill-suited
to address the subtle types of discrimination believed to be most common 
in the modern workplace.24 The promulgation of McDonnell Douglas as
18. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017). For 
a survey of the various ways by which the ultimate burden of persuasion can be established in
retaliation cases, see generally YANG, supra note 11. 
19. See Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148). It is important to note this raises only a permissive inference, 
and  the  trier  of fact  is given the freedom of  decision.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 ( “[A]
plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s
asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated.”). 
20. Foster, 787 F.3d at 251 (quoting Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 
457 (4th Cir. 1989)); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (describing the burden as “not 
onerous”). 
21. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–56. 
22. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
This explanation that McDonnell Douglas requires discrimination to be the “real reason”
has led some circuits to believe that the framework has always required but-for causation.  
See infra Section II.C.2. 
23. For a discussion of alternative methods of proof, see infra Section II.A.1.
24. Most criticism has stemmed from limitations placed on the framework by the
Supreme Court and the fact that plaintiffs have not been faring well in court despite the
perception that employment discrimination remains prevalent. See, e.g., Chambers,
supra note 16, at 99–100; Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1177, 1181 (2003); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 111
(2003); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
942
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a hindrance to plaintiffs—rather than suggesting a move away from the
framework, as many pundits suggest—demonstrates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the framework and its purpose.25 
Proving discriminatory causation is tough because there are very few
ways by which to do so.26 Defendant admissions work, but unsurprisingly, 
such admissions are extraordinary.27 Also, as employers have become
litigation-seasoned, statements by decision makers that do not amount to 
admissions, but nevertheless suggest bias, have become increasingly rare.28 
Another method is through the use of statistics, but the large number of 
decisions required by decision makers makes this method unlikely and the 
need for experts too costly in most cases.29 Finally, a plaintiff may prove
ALA. L. REV. 741, 758 (2005); Malamud, supra note 16, at 2235 n.28 (discussing the 
outcry in commentary about Hicks and its limitation of McDonnell Douglas).
25. Indeed, some pundits even suggest McDonnell Douglas is either doctrinally or 
functionally dead. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert 
Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 935 (2005); see also Chambers, supra note 
16, at 88–89; Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le roi est mort; vive le roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet 
Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa Into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72 (2003); 
William R. Corbett, Note, McDonnell-Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 200 (2003) (describing McDonnell Douglas “dead as  a  
doornail”).
26. Linda Hamilton Krieger points out that proving discriminatory causation is
difficult because even if the factual record leads one “to believe that race, gender, or
national origin ‘made a difference,’ [Title VII doctrine requires finding either] that the 
decision maker intended to discriminate or that no discrimination occurred.” Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (1995). Such a conflation
of intention and causation, Krieger argues, represents a misunderstanding of how cognitive bias
works.  See id.
27. See id. at 1167 (describing employer admissions as “careless”); see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 255 n.8 (1981) (observing that proving intentional discrimination is “elusive”). 
28. See id. Audrey J. Lee points out that society’s heightened awareness regarding the
legal ramifications for discriminatory transgressions has made employers much more
skilled at hiding any potentially discriminatory conduct. Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious 
Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 488
(2005) (“[E]mployers’ heightened awareness of the legal ramifications for discriminatory 
transgressions—learned through litigation, among other means—suggests that employers 
will be increasingly savvy in not documenting, outwardly expressing, or retaining anything that
is potentially damaging.”). 
29. Lee argues that statistical evidence, while very powerful, is often an extremely 
difficult threshold for plaintiffs to demonstrate at the prima facie stage of litigation. Lee,
supra, at 496 n.87; see, e.g., EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2000) (finding “no statistically-significant disparity” between the percentage of
943
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causation through comparative evidence.30 However, the comparators’
situations are seldom indistinguishable from the plaintiff’s situation, often 
disqualifying the use of such evidence.31 
By contrast, McDonnell Douglas pretext evidence does not depend on 
expensive statistics, unlikely admissions, overheard statements, or differently
treated comparators.32 Often, pretext evidence will be the only evidence
available.33  If McDonnell Douglas were done away with, or never existed in
the first place, many plaintiffs lacking direct evidence—but victims of 
discrimination nevertheless—would lose any chance at a remedy.34 The
framework forces employers to provide a reason for their actions and thus 
gives plaintiffs a tangible object to attack and discredit.35 It truly is a benefit
to plaintiffs, and its loss would result in one less way of accomplishing 
women who actually applied and those who were hired as servers, despite no women being 
hired during the fifty-year period at issue). 
30. A plaintiff attempting to prove retaliation using a “comparable non-protected
person was treated better” method must produce evidence which at a minimum establishes (1)
that he was a member of a protected class and (2) that for the same or similar conduct he
was treated differently than “similarly-situated” non-minority employees. Mitchell v. 
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 
345, 347 (6th Cir. 1988). Specific factors “include whether the employees (i) held the same job 
description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same
supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications 
—provided the employer considered these latter factors in making the personnel decision.”  
Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Paterson v. 
Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002)).
31. See, e.g., Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, 463 F.3d 731, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding summary judgment appropriate where comparators were not sufficiently comparable 
to the plaintiff). 
32. Whether ratcheting up a plaintiff’s burden of proof to but-for was proper is
beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather, the focus here is the continued efficacy of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework despite the increased burden imposed by Nassar. Compare 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), with Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
33. For a discussion of how the subtle nature of modern discrimination—as
opposed to the malignant, blatant discrimination that existed prior to the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act—has led to increasing use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in Title
VII cases, see Lee, supra note 28, at 482. 
34. The framework was devised in part as an answer to the increasing scarcity of 
so-called smoking gun evidence to give plaintiffs without such evidence their day in court.  
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“The shifting burdens
of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‘plaintiff has his
day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.’” (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 
600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979))); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 255 n.8 (1981) (stating that the function of the framework is “to sharpen the inquiry
into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination”).
35.  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–56. 
944
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the challenging job of proving causation.36 To get a clear picture of this
debate, a brief discussion of but-for causation is instructive.
 2.  But-For Causation 
Consider Burrage v. United States,37 wherein the Supreme Court exemplified 
but-for causation as follows: “where A shoots B, who is hit and dies, we
can say that A actually caused B’s death, since but for A’s conduct B
would not have died.”38 In their concurrence, Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor stressed that the words “because of” were not to be misconstrued
as meaning “solely because of.”39  In  other  words, the same  act  can be  
considered a but-for cause if it combines with other factors to produce the 
outcome, so long as the other factors alone would not have done so.40 
Accordingly, a but-for cause need not be the sole cause, but it must be the 
straw that broke the camel’s back.  The majority opinion expressed agreement 
with this understanding via a hypothetical: 
Consider a baseball game in which the visiting team’s leadoff batter hits a home
run in the top of the first inning. If the visiting team goes on to win by a score
of 1 to 0, every person competent in the English language and familiar with the 
American pastime would agree that the victory resulted from the home run. This
is so because it is natural to say that one event is the outcome or consequence 
of another when the former would not have occurred but for the latter. It is beside
the point that the victory also resulted from a host of other necessary causes, such
as skillful pitching, the coach’s decision to put the leadoff batter in the lineup,
and the league’s decision to schedule the game. By contrast, it makes little sense 
to say that an event resulted from or was the outcome of some earlier action if the
action merely played a nonessential contributing role in producing the event. If the
visiting team wound up winning 5 to 2 rather than 1 to 0, one would be surprised
36. Some believe McDonnell Douglas might even be functionally dead. See infra
Section II.C.1.
37. See generally Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
38. Id. at 888 (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(b) (2d
ed. 2003)). 
39. Id. at 892 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 379–384 (2013)).  It is important in this analysis to understand that 
the but-for causation standard does not require retaliation to be the sole cause of the action;
there can be multiple but-for causes and retaliation need only be a but-for cause of the
adverse action for the employee to prevail. Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 
846 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘[B]ut-for’ causation does not require proof that retaliation was the 
only cause of the employer’s action, but only that the adverse action would not have 
occurred in the absence of a retaliatory motive.”).
40. See Kwan, 737 F.3d at 846. 
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It is helpful in this instance to contrast a but-for causal standard from
the previously available motivating factor standard. A but-for factor is a
necessary factor because the decision—such as a firing—would not have 
occurred absent that factor, whereas a motivating factor is one that has a 
tendency to bring about a decision—such as firing—but is not necessary
to that decision.42 This happens in decisions where a person considers a 
factor—such as race—but would have made the same decision even had
they not considered that factor due to the presence of some other 
factor—such as tardiness.43 
B.  University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
Given that they are often raised “in tandem,” Title VII retaliation claims 
and discriminatory claims have historically been considered under the
same standard.44 To prove causation under a status-based discrimination 
claim, it is enough to show that a motive to discriminate was one of the 
defendant’s motives, even if the defendant had other causative legal
motives—this is the lessened causation standard known as the “motivating 
factor” test.45 Although application of the McDonnell Douglas framework
also requires the plaintiff in a retaliation claim to establish the element of 
causation, the framework and its application among circuit courts left it 
unclear whether the plaintiff must prove motivating-factor causation or a
more stringent standard.46  In University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
Center v. Nassar, the Court drove a wedge through this traditional partnership 
between discriminatory and retaliation claims when it declared a 
retaliation claim must meet the stricter but-for causation standard.47 
41. Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 888. Preponderance of the evidence is the evidentiary 
burden under a but-for or motivating causation standard. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362; see 
also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 178 n.4 (2009) (emphasizing that under
the but-for causation standard “[t]here is no heightened evidentiary requirement”). 
42. For a more thorough investigation of but-for causation, see Martin  J. Katz,  The
Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment
Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 505–07 (2006). 
43. See id. at 505–06, 513. In Smith v. Xerox Corp., a case preceding Nassar, the
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff and application of the 
motivating factor standard where both legitimate and illegitimate motives existed for  
termination.  602 F.3d 320, 334, 336 (5th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Nassar, 570 U.S. 338. 
44. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 342–44; see supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
46. In fact, the assumption that the framework itself requires a specific standard of 
causation represents a fundamental misunderstanding of how pretext evidence works. See 
infra text accompanying notes 140–41.
47. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362. 
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In Nassar, the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center had 
an arrangement with Parkland Memorial Hospital whereby the hospital 
offered its unoccupied posts to University faculty members.48 Dr. Nassar,
a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent, worked as both a University
faculty member and a staff physician at the hospital.49 He claimed his 
supervisor at the University “was biased against him on account of his
religion and ethnic heritage.”50 He alleged that the supervisor displayed
her bias through undeserved scrutiny of his billing practices and productivity,
as well as through her statements like “Middle Easterners are lazy.”51 
After arranging to continue working at the hospital without also being on
the University’s faculty, Dr. Nassar resigned his teaching post and sent a 
letter stating his departure was due to harassment by his supervisor.52 
Subsequently, the Chair of Internal Medicine expressed consternation at 
Nassar’s accusations and protested his continued employment at the hospital as 
inconsistent with the affiliation agreement’s requirements.53 “The [h]ospital 
then withdrew its offer” to continue his employment.54 
Nassar “alleged two discrete violations [under] Title VII. The first was
a status-based discrimination claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e–2(a) . . . 
alleg[ing] that [the supervisor’s] racially and religiously motivated
harassment had resulted in his constructive discharge.”55  Second, Nassar 
claimed that the Chair’s efforts to prevent his continued employment at 
the hospital “were in retaliation for complaining about [the supervisor’s]
harassment, in violation of § 2000e–3(a).”56 The jury found for Nassar on
both claims; the Fifth Circuit vacated as to the underlying status cause of
action but affirmed the retaliation award.57 It held that Nassar had established 
that the hospital was “motivated” by a desire to retaliate against him for
opposing discrimination.58 The hospital appealed, arguing Nassar should
48. Id. at 338. 
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 344 (quoting Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr, 674 F.3d 448, 450 
(5th Cir. 2012)).
52.  Id.
53. Id. at 344–45. 
54. Id. at 345. 
55.  Id.
56.  Id. (citing Nassar v. Univ. of Tex., 674 F.3d at 450). 
57.  Id.
58. Id. at 345–46. 
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have had to prove retaliation was a but-for cause of his firing and that he
lacked the evidence to satisfy the more stringent burden.59 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court sided with the hospital.60  The  
majority gave several reasons for its decision. First, it noted that traditional 
tort principles of causation require a plaintiff to show the harm would not
have taken place in the absence of—but-for—the defendant’s conduct.61 
These default rules, the Court reasoned, are “presumed to have been 
incorporated” into Title VII unless the statute indicates otherwise.62  Second,
the Court looked at its decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,63 where
it held that “because of” as used in the status-discrimination provision of
Title VII meant “that a plaintiff could [win on a status-based] discrimination 
[claim if the plaintiff] could show one of the prohibited traits was a 
‘motivating’ . . . factor in the employer’s decision.”64 “If the plaintiff made 
that showing, the burden of persuasion shifted to the [defendant, who
could avoid] liability if it could prove that it would have taken the same . . .
action in the absence of any discriminatory” attitude.65 In other words,
the defendant must establish “a discriminatory motive was not the but-for 
cause of” its actions against the plaintiff.66 
Third, the Court examined its subsequent decision in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., where it interpreted the phrase “because of . . .
age”67 in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)68 to mean
that age was required to be the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse 
decision.69 The anti-retaliation provision’s use of the very same because 
59. See id.
60. Id. at 339–40. 
61. Id. at 346–47 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 431 cmt. a, 432(1) cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1934)). 
62. Id. at 347. 
63.  490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
64. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258). Price
Waterhouse was codified two years later in § 2000e-2(m) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
stating: “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018). 
65. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258–60, 276– 
77). 
66. Id. 
 67.  557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) 
68.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018). 
69. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–80. Unfortunately, whether the Court’s interpretation 
of “because of” in the ADEA as calling for a but-for causation standard was appropriate
when it was already established that the same language allowed for a mixed-motive standard 
under Title VII is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For an in-depth analysis of the topic, see
generally Lauren Smith, Comment, Motivating Factor Versus But-For Causation in
Claims Arising Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 643 (2017).
948
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of language as the ADEA implied that the but-for standard governed 
retaliation claims the same as ADEA claims.70 Fourth, the Court noted 
that when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to say a plaintiff’s 
burden is to prove that “race, color, religion, sex, [or] national origin” 
discrimination motivated an employer but left in place the retaliation
provision’s because of language, it intended to preserve the more stringent 
but-for standard of causation for retaliation claims.71 Congress could have
applied the motivating factor standard of causation to all unlawful practices
but did not, so the Court interpreted the statute according to its plain 
meaning as the complexity and meticulousness of Title VII demands.72 
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the Court justified its interpretation of
the statute on the basis of judicial economy, observing that a lesser causation 
standard would incentivize employees to file frivolous claims.73  According
to the Court, raising the employer’s costs of litigation and the risk of
damage to the employer’s reputation is “inconsistent with the structure 
and operation of Title VII.”74 The heightened but-for causation standard
thus serves employers and the judicial system by inhibiting frivolous litigation
from progressing to trial.75 
Justice Ginsburg authored a dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, arguing that the relationship between anti-discrimination and 
anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII requires the same burden of proof 
because “[a]ntiretaliation provisions ‘seek to secure . . . or advance enforcement
of antidiscrimination guarantees.’”76 By passing anti-discrimination 
legislation, Congress sought to create a workplace where employees are
t   Yet anti-
discrimination guarantees would be meaningless if employees decided not 
reated equally regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, or sex.77
to file grievances for fear of retaliation.78 In ruling that a retaliation claim
requires proof of but-for causation, Justice Ginsburg argued that the
majority has undermined the will of Congress by appropriating a provision
meant to strengthen Title VII § 2000e-2(m), separating it from the motivating 
70.  See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352. 
71. Id. at 352–62. 
72. Id. at 353–54. 
73. Id. at 358–59. 
74. Id.
75. See id. at 358. 
76. Id. at 363, 367–68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006)).
77. See id. at 367–68. 
78. See id. at 368 (citing Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67). 
949





   
 
     
 
    
  
    
      
  
 
    
     
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
     
         
  
    
 
  
      
     
          
      
           
   
 
   
  
   
  
   
factor standard of discrimination claims, and thereby “turn[ing] it into a
measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”79 
Justice Ginsburg further argued that allocating different standards of 
causation would in fact hinder judicial economy.80 Plaintiffs regularly
bring retaliation and discrimination claims in the same action and “[c]ausation
is a complicated concept to convey to juries in the best of circumstances.”81 
Requiring a jury to sort through liability based on multiple standards 
of causation is almost certain to cause confusion.82 Additionally, Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that a “but-for test is particularly ill-suited to employment
discrimination cases.”83 Such a standard requires the jury to determine which 
one of the employer’s multiple motives was the actual impetus for action, a
task that may often be impossible given that employers’ actions are rarely
based on a single motive.84 
C.  Post-Nassar Circuit Application 
While the Court in Nassar held that a plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation 
claim must prove the employer’s retaliatory purpose represented a but-for
cause of the adverse employment action,85 the Court made no mention of 
the ubiquitous McDonnell Douglas framework, nor of cases that opt to 
use the framework due to lack of direct evidence of employer motive.86 
The Court left it to the district and appellate courts to determine whether
the plaintiff must prove but-for causation merely at the pretext stage or 
the prima facie stage as well.87 Some have even suggested the shift to but-
for causation in retaliation suits effectively nullified McDonnell Douglas.88 
79. Id. at 364, 371–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For an analysis of how the change 
of law that resulted from the Supreme Court holding in Gross may result  in a legal
paradigm that favors defendants over plaintiffs in the regulation of age discrimination, see 
Richard L. Wiener & Katlyn S. Farnum, The Psychology of Jury Decision Making in Age 
Discrimination Claims, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 395, 407 (2013). 
80.  See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 383 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
81.  Id.
82. Id. Questions concerning jury confusion, and competence in general, are not 
new. In the past, the Supreme Court has suggested courts should consider the practical
abilities and limitations of juries in determining if an issue is triable by a jury. E.g., Ross 
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). Indeed, some courts implied a complexity
exception as a result of Ross. See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99,
105 (W.D. Wash. 1976); see also Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 67 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
83.  Nassar, 570 U.S. at 384–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
84. See id. at 385. 
85. Id. at 352. 
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 363. 
88. See supra note 25. 
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1.  Circuits Placing the Burden at the Prima Facie Stage 
Some circuits have found, post-Nassar, that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff
must establish but-for cause as part of its prima facie showing.89  In EEOC 
v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff was “[a] former Ford resale buyer with 
irritable bowel syndrome” whose performance over the years had steadily
dropped to the point where Ford concluded she was not performing “the
basic functions of her position.”90 In addition to performing poorly, she 
apparently “worked on a ‘sporadic and unpredictable basis’ . . . and had
‘chronic attendance issues.’”91 When the plaintiff was denied her request 
to work from home on an as-needed basis, she filed a charge of disability
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).92 
Ford fired the plaintiff four months later.93 The EEOC brought an action
alleging Ford violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to 
accommodate the plaintiff’s disability and that the company “discharged
her in retaliation for filing” a charge with the EEOC.94 “The district court 
granted Ford’s motion [for summary judgment and] the EEOC appealed . . . .”95 
Initially foregoing an analysis of the EEOC’s prima facie case,96 the  
court concluded that Ford met its burden of producing evidence that the 
plaintiff was fired for nonretaliatory purposes—specifically, “because she 
was a poor performer.”97 Ford “offered undisputed evidence of back-to-
back-to-back poor performance reviews, [the plaintiff’s] lacking [of]
interpersonal skills, and [the plaintiff’s] many absences, which in turn 
89. A court placing but-for causation at the prima facie stage would require a
plaintiff to show the following: (1) “she engaged in protected activity”; (2) “her employer 
took adverse action against her”; and (3) but for the protected activity, the adverse
employment activity would not have occurred.  Foster v. Univ. of Md.–E Shore, 787 F.3d 
243, 250 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004)); 
see also Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006)); Montell v. Diversified
Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir. 2014). 
90. 782 F.3d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2015). 
91. Id.
92. Id. at 760. 
93. Id. at 782. 
94. Id. at 760. 
95. Id. (citing EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
96. It is unclear why the court decided to conduct the prima facie analysis at the end
instead of the beginning. Regardless, the timing of the court’s analysis does not change 
the fact that the court required but-for causation at the prima facie stage. See id. at 770. 
97. Id. at 767. 
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caused mistakes.”98 The court further concluded that the EEOC had failed
to produce sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find
that poor performance was not the real reason Ford terminated the plaintiff 
and that unlawful retaliation was in fact the real reason.99 
Having so concluded, the court summarily addressed the EEOC’s prima
facie case at the end of its analysis.100 In doing so, the court found that
“[t]o prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must ‘establish that his or
her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the
employer.’”101 The court insisted “that the EEOC must present evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find that Ford would not have fired 
[the plaintiff] if she had not made her charge.”102 Thus the court decided,
without any real reasoning on the matter, that the new Nassar standard 
applies not merely to a plaintiff’s ultimate burden, but also to a plaintiff’s 
burden at the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.103 
The EEOC could not demonstrate that Ford would have fired the plaintiff 
regardless of her EEOC charge, and thus, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Ford.104 
The dissent argued that even if Nassar applied at the prima facie stage, 
the plaintiff “does not need to prove that Ford never would have fired her, 
even at some later point, had she not filed her . . . complaint.”105 Even though 
the plaintiff might have eventually been fired because of her poor performance,
the key issue was “whether the EEOC charge . . . was the poison that
precipitated that firing to occur at the particular time it did.”106  It  would  
appear that under the majority’s interpretation of Nassar’s but-for standard,
“it would be impossible for employees with performance problems to
bring a retaliation claim based on a theory that [the retaliation was not]
truly motivate[d]” by the poor performance.107 
The Sixth Circuit’s off hand decision that the Nassar standard also applied 
at the prima facie stage shows how eager courts are to rid themselves of
retaliation claims more easily. In Montell v. Diversified Clinical Services,
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 770. 




105. Id. at 782 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Nassar, 570 U.S. 338). 
106. Id.
107. Id. at 783. In essence, the dissent argued that, in addition to failing to distinguish
the difference between a prima facie case and proving pretext, the majority also failed to
recognize retaliation may still be a but-for cause even if an employee may have had a
record of poor performance. For an explanation of but-for causation, see supra Section
II.A.2. 
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Inc., the same court, just one year prior, applied Nassar’s but-for standard
at the ultimate stage of  the  framework.108 There, the court noted the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas “presents the risk that
litigants and courts will fail to [recognize the difference] between the
plaintiff’s intermediate and ultimate burdens” of proof.109 The court
further emphasized that the intermediate burdens of the “burden-shifting 
framework . . . are intended ‘to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously
and fairly to [its] ultimate question.’”110 The court concluded that the
plaintiff will have to “establish that her protected activity was a but-for cause
of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”111 The Sixth Circuit’s about-
face and reticence to offer any policy arguments may not be based on the 
most erudite reasoning, but the change at least comports with the Supreme 
Court’s explicit pronouncements in Nassar, evincing deep concerns about 
judicial efficiency and the need to eliminate frivolous claims.112 
The Third,113 Tenth,114 and Eleventh115 Circuits have demonstrated
similar trends toward applying but-for causation at the prima facie stage.
An examination of the Eleventh Circuit’s evolution of post-Nassar case
law is illuminating. 
In Ramirez v. Bausch & Lamb, Inc.—the Eleventh Circuit’s first
opportunity to apply Nassar to a retaliation claim involving circumstantial 
evidence—the court followed the Supreme Court’s lead and declined to 
clarify at which stage of the proceeding the plaintiff must prove but-for 
causation, explicitly leaving it to the district courts to fill the jurisprudential
void.116 
108. Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir. 2014). 
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). 
111. Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013)). 
112. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 358. 
113. See generally Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 2009). The
Third Circuit upheld a finding that the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case that age was a but-for cause of his termination. Id. at 691. 
114. See generally Ward v. Jewell, 772 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014). Citing Nassar’s 
but-for requirement, the Tenth Circuit upheld a finding that plaintiff failed to present
sufficient evidence connecting the adverse employment actions to his participation in
EEOC proceedings.  Id. at 1203. 
115. See generally Smith v. City of Fort Pierce, 565 F. App’x 774 (11th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit applied a but-for requirement in analyzing plaintiff’s 
prima facie case in affirming a grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor. Id. at 
778–79. 
116. Ramirez v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 546 F. App’x 829, 833 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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In its next crack at the issue, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to side with 
the plaintiff, establishing but-for causation in the pretext stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework in Mealing v. Georgia Dep’t of Juvenile 
Justice.117 While discussing the framework, the court said that when the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 
to offer a legitimate reason for the adverse action, which, if successful,
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to “show that the legitimate reasons
offered by the employer for taking the adverse action were pretexts for 
unlawful retaliation . . . and that the plaintiff’s protected activity was the 
‘but-for’ cause of the adverse action.”118 In its application of the standard,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish but-for causation 
because he offered no evidence he would have been terminated but for his 
complaints.119 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to have finally decided 
to place the plaintiff’s burden of proving but-for causation at the pretext
stage of the framework. 
However, subsequent decisions have seen the Eleventh Circuit make a
U-turn and consistently locate the burden in the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case. Adams v. City of Montgomery, a per curium decision, marked the 
Eleventh Circuit’s first move toward applying the but-for standard at the
prima facie stage.120 That opinion began by listing the three elements of
a prima facie case: “Title VII requires the plaintiff to show that (1) he 
engaged in an activity protected under Title VII, (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”121  The court  
immediately thereafter explained that the holding in Nassar requires proof
that retaliation was the but-for cause of the action, impliedly locating the
burden in the prima facie stage.122 In two subsequent cases, the court again
intimated that the plaintiff must meet the burden at the prima facie stage
by providing an explanation of Nassar’s but-for holding directly after 
listing the elements of a prima facie case.123 
117. Mealing v. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 564 F. 421, 427 (11th Cir. 2014).
118. Id. (first quoting Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th 
Cir. 2010); and then citing Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 361 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
119. Id. at 429. 
120. See 569 F. App’x 769, 772 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
121. Id. (citing Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
122. Id. at 772–73 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 
339 (2013)). While not explicitly stated, there is a strong implication that the court drew 
from the “causal connection” language of prong three that proof of but-for causation is 
required at the prima facie stage. Id. at 772–73. 
123. See Jones v. Suburban Propane, Inc., 577 F. App’x 951, 954–55 (11th Cir.
2014); Jackson v. UPS, Inc., 593 F. App’x 871, 877 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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In Swindle v. Jefferson County Commission, the Eleventh Circuit finally 
unambiguously located the burden within the prima facie stage of the 
case.124 Subsequent decisions show a definite pattern of placing the burden 
in the prima facie stage rather than the pretext stage.125 The fact that every 
decision on this matter in the Eleventh Circuit has come in an unpublished
per curiam opinion suggests that the court is reticent to clear up the uncertainty. 
This mirrors the Supreme Court’s failure to detail exactly how its holding
would work in practice. 
Regardless, district courts have followed the pattern set by the unpublished 
opinions and have settled on applying the burden at the prima facie stage.126 
These district courts have also followed the circuit court’s lead by failing 
to provide any detailed reasoning as to why Nassar’s but-for requirement
should apply at the prima facie stage.127  The most that could be extrapolated 
from the Eleventh Circuit’s stance are policy arguments in favor of judicial 
economy and the elimination of frivolous claims, but its unwillingness to
argue on behalf of its position suggests that the Eleventh Circuit’s deference
to the circuit courts on the ground level has been less than successful. 
2.  Circuits Placing the Burden at the Pretext Stage 
Other courts have held, either expressly or implicitly, that Nassar did
not alter the elements of a prima facie case as stipulated by the McDonnell 
Douglas framework.128 
The Third Circuit held in Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University
that Nassar only applied to a plaintiff’s ultimate burden.129 The case involved
124. See Swindle v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 593 F. App’x 919, 929 n.10 (11th Cir. 
2014) (explaining that the prima facie case requires a showing that the plaintiff’s “protected
activity was a ‘but for’ cause of the harassment”).
125. See Rives v. Lahood, 605 F. App’x 815, 818–19 (11th Cir. 2015) (first quoting 
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2009); and then quoting Nassar, 580
at 362); Clark v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 601 F. App’x 886, 899 (11th Cir. 2015); Baroudi 
v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 616 F. App’x 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2015) (first 
citing Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010); and then
citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362); Torres-Skair v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 595 F. App’x
847, 857 (11th Cir. 2014) (first citing Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th
Cir. 2012); and then citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362). 
126. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., Swindle, 593 F. App’x at 929 n.10.
128. Thus, at the initial prima facie stage, a plaintiff need only give evidence sufficient to
raise the inference that her engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for the
adverse employment action, not the but-for reason. 
129. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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an appeal from a district court’s order of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant.130 The plaintiff in this case, Dr. Carvalho-Grievious, had 
sued her former employer, Delaware State University.131  She had been  
dismissed as chairperson of the Department of Social Work at the University, 
and she claimed “the premature termination of her term as chairperson
was unlawful retaliation for her complaints about [the Dean’s] sexual 
harassment, racial discrimination, and related retaliation.”132  Her case  
relied in part on suspicious timing—a month after complaints about the 
harassment, the University decided to terminate her employment at the 
end of the school year.133 Although the University argued it removed her
from her chairperson position and revised her contract because of her 
“inability to work collegially,” Dr. Grevious claimed that at the meeting 
to discuss her termination, the provost admitted his recommendation was 
based on her filing of the EEOC charge, and that the ultimate decision was 
unrelated to her teaching or professional performance.134  The provost  
denied “making such admissions . . . and claim[ed] the decision was based
on Dr. Grevious’s documented interpersonal conflict with the University.”135 
“Dr. Grievous filed an additional EEOC charge upon her termination, alleging 
the University retaliated against her for filing the charges.”136 
After exhausting her administrative remedies, Dr. Grevious filed suit in 
the district court for the District of Delaware, alleging “that by retaliating 
against her for complaining about discriminatory employment practices
based on race and gender, the University violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.”137 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the University, finding Dr. Grievous failed to establish a prima
facie case of causation because “no reasonable jury could find that, but
for [her] complaints . . . she would have been retained . . . .”138 
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal considered “whether a 
plaintiff asserting a Title VII retaliation claim must establish but-for
causation as part of her prima facie case pursuant to” Nassar.139  The court
held that just as “the ‘but-for’ causation requirement in proving claims 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act” did “not conflict with 
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 255. 
133. Id.
134. Id. at 255–56. 
135. Id. at 256. 
136. Id.
137. Id. at 253. 
138. Id. at 256 (citing Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., No. 13-1386, 2015 WL 
5768940, at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2015)). 
139. Id. at 253 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)). 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
[its] continued application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm,” the 
“‘but-for’ causation standard required by Nassar” does not preclude application 
of McDonnell Douglas.140 Although the burden of production might shift
back and forth under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff 
retains the “ultimate burden of persuasion at all times,” and thus McDonnell
Douglas has no effect on the standard of causation that the plaintiff must
prove “as part of her ultimate burden of persuasion.”141 In other words,
the framework does not care what burden of persuasion is applied, so long
as the burdens of production shifts at the appropriate stages.
Further, the Third Circuit’s earlier formulations of the causation standard— 
“determinative effect” or “real reason”—“differ in terminology” from the
Supreme Court’s but-for standard, but “they are functionally the same.”142 
In finding that McDonnell Douglas has no effect on the burden of
persuasion and that Nassar’s but-for requirement was already in effect in the 
Third Circuit, the court concluded that staying consistent with McDonnell 
Douglas’s precedential application was appropriate.143 Thus, “at the prima
facie stage, a plaintiff need only [give] evidence sufficient to raise the
inference that her engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason
for the adverse employment action, not the but-for reason.”144 Although
the Third Circuit acknowledged the Nassar Court’s concern that a lesser
causation standard could “contribute to the filing of frivolous claims,”145 
the Third Circuit pointed out that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11’s
certification requirements were put in place for just that purpose.146 
140. Id. at 257 (quoting Smith v. Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009)).
141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Daniels v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193
(3d Cir. 2015)). The court correctly deduced that McDonnell Douglas functions as a
burden shifting framework that provides a method of proving causation but does not 
specify a causal standard.  See infra Part IV.
142. Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258. To the extent the Third Circuit implies 
McDonnell Douglas already proves but-for causation, this Comment disagrees.  See infra 
text accompanying note 189. 
143. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258–59.
144. Id. at 253. 
145. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013). 
146. Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
insists attorneys certify that any papers filed with the court are “well grounded in fact,” 
legally plausible, and not put forth for an “improper purpose.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). An attorney who violates Rule 11 will be sanctioned.
Id.
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The Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Foster v. University 
of Maryland–Eastern Shore.147  In Foster, the plaintiff was hired as a campus
police officer “subject to a standard six-month probationary period.”148  A
month into her employment, the plaintiff complained to her supervisors 
that a coworker had sexually harassed her.149 Although the coworker’s
conduct was immediately and appropriately resolved, the plaintiff claimed
her probation was extended an additional six months in retaliation for her
complaints.150  The plaintiff further alleged “the University retaliated
against her over the next several months by changing her schedule without
notice, denying her tuition remission, denying her light duty following an 
injury, and barring her from attending a training session while she was on
injury leave.”151 Within a month after the plaintiff’s last complaint, she
was terminated without explanation.152  The University’s Director of Human
Resources candidly asserted one reason for firing the plaintiff was that she
“was fixated on her harassment experience and became preoccupied with it” 
to the extent that she had become “an ‘unacceptable fit’ for the position of
police officer.”153 
After working through the McDonnell Douglas framework, the district
court denied the defendant’s summary judgment motion because a 
“‘reasonable jury could find that the instances which Defendant made it
more difficult for Plaintiff to work and attend training’ demonstrated
retaliatory animus that was ‘causally related’ to her termination,” and “a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reasons for termination
were pretextual.”154 The Nassar decision came down following the district
court’s denial of the defendant’s summary judgment motion and the defendant 
filed a motion for reconsideration in light of the new but-for requirement.155 
Upon reconsideration, the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant, concluding that although a reasonable jury could find a 
“causal link” between the complaint and the plaintiff’s termination, it 
could not find that “her protected activity was the determinative reason
for her termination under [the new] Nassar” standard.156 The plaintiff made 
a timely appeal.157 
147. 787 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2015). 
148.  Id. 
149. Id.
150. Id. at 246–47. 
151. Id. at 247. 
152. Id.
153. Id. at 246–47. 
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that Nassar clearly
“altered the causation standard for claims based on direct evidence of 
retaliatory animus by rejecting the ‘mixed motive’ theory of liability for 
retaliation claims,” but pointed out that Nassar did not address the “pretext 
framework” the plaintiff used in this case.158 As such, whether Nassar
has any bearing on the causation prong of the prima facie case is up for
debate.159 
As an initial matter of analysis, the court correctly pointed out that the 
causation standards for establishing a prima facie retaliation case and
proving pretext are not identical.160 At the prima facie stage, the burden is
meant to be “less onerous.”  According to the court, “applying the ultimate
causation standard at the prima facie stage [would be the same as] 
eliminating the McDonnell Douglas framework [altogether] in retaliation 
cases by [limiting] the use of pretext evidence to those plaintiffs who do
not need it.”161 In other words, if a “plaintiff[] can prove but-for causation
at the prima facie stage, [the plaintiff] will necessarily be able to satisfy
the[] ultimate burden of persuasion without proceeding through a pretext 
analysis.”162 By the same logic, a plaintiff who cannot satisfy the ultimate 
burden of persuasion without support of pretext evidence would never 
make it past the prima facie stage to reach the pretext stage.163  “Had the
Nassar Court intended to retire McDonnell Douglas and set aside 40 years
of precedent,” the court concluded, “it would have spoken plainly and 
clearly to that effect.”164 
Having determined “that Nassar does not alter the causation prong of a
prima facie case of retaliation,” the court next considered Nassar’s effect
on “the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.”165  Similar
to Carvalho-Grevious, the court concluded that because the framework
already requires plaintiffs to prove retaliation was the actual reason for the 
challenged employment action, Nassar has no effect.166  According to the
court, the ultimate burden of persuasion under McDonnell Douglas requires 
158. Id. at 249–50. 
159. See id. at 250–51. 
160. Id. at 251; see supra Section II.A. 
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See infra Part III. 
164.  Foster, 787 F.3d at 251. 
165. Id. at 251–52. 
166. Id. at 252. This Comment disagrees with the contention that McDonnell Douglas 
necessarily proves but-for causation. See infra Section III.A.
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a plaintiff to establish “both that the employer’s reason was false and that
retaliation was the real reason for the challenged conduct.”167 A plaintiff
who can meet the McDonnell Douglas “real reason” standard—that retaliation 
was “the real reason for the adverse employment action”—“will 
necessarily . . .‘show that the harm would not have occurred in the absence
of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.’”168 
Having established that Nassar does not alter the legal standard for 
adjudicating a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim, the court found that 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
University.169 The court determined a “reasonable jury could [find] that
the University’s proffered justifications” were pretextual and that the 
“actual reason for firing [the plaintiff] was to retaliate against her for 
complaining about [the] alleged sexual harassment and for her subsequent 
complaints of ongoing retaliation.”170 In other words, a reasonable jury
could find the plaintiff would not have been terminated but for her  
employer’s retaliatory animus.171 
The Second,172 Fifth,173 Sixth,174 and Eleventh Circuits175 have all referenced
similar arguments as those expressed in Carvalho-Grevious and Foster to 
state that Nassar does not alter the elements of a prima facie case as
stipulated by the McDonnell Douglas test. 
167. Foster, 787 F.3d at 252 (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Wash. Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 
(4th Cir. 1995)).
168. Id. (first quoting Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 
2007); and then quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47
(2013)). 
169. Id. at 246. 
170. Id. at 254. 
171. Id. 
172. See generally Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 2013). The 
Second Circuit explicitly held that the but-for causation standard established by Nassar
“does not alter the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage on
summary judgment or at trial indirectly through temporal proximity.” Id. at 845. 
173. See generally Hague v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 560 F. 
App’x 328 (5th Cir. 2014); Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 
450 (5th Cir. 2013). In both Hague and Feist, the Fifth Circuit assumed the plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case before continuing on to ask whether the plaintiff had
established but-for causation during the pretext stage. See Hague, 560 F. App’x at 335– 
36; Feist, 730 F.3d at 454. 
174. See generally Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497 (6th
Cir. 2014). The Sixth Circuit refused to raise the evidentiary standard for the causation
determination to survive summary judgment.  Id. at 507. 
175. See generally Butterworth v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 581 F. App’x 813 
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit explained that, assuming the plaintiff 
had established a prima facie case of retaliation, she would still be unable to establish a
but-for causal connection, thus implying a lesser causal standard for the prima facie case.
Id. at 817. 
960
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III. NASSAR’S EFFECT ON MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
The Supreme Court’s holding that Title VII retaliation claims are subject 
to a but-for causal requirement has certainly thrown a monkey wrench into 
the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework.176 Though federal
courts have been extremely cagey about providing any detailed reasoning
as to the impact of Nassar on McDonnell Douglas, a survey of the cases
reveals the general policy considerations underlying two main camps. 
In the prima facie stage camp, the main policy considerations appear to 
be deep concerns about judicial efficiency and the need to mitigate 
frivolous claims.177 According to this camp, because Nassar will require
the plaintiff to prove at some stage in the burden-shifting framework that
the defendant’s retaliatory purpose actually caused the adverse action, a
plaintiff that cannot make a prima facie case of retaliation could never 
establish that the defendant’s reason was a mere pretext.178  In this way,
district courts could dismiss more Title VII retaliation claims at the summary
judgment stage and avoid the time and monetary expense of trial. 
Arguments based on judicial efficiency and the elimination of frivolous 
claims, while maybe not based on the most adroit legal reasoning, at least
have the virtue of aligning with the Supreme Court’s explicit assertions in 
Nassar.179 The hypothetical scenario painted by the Supreme Court, where
an employee files a baseless discrimination charge just before an anticipated 
termination, suggests a powerful fear on the part of the judiciary that 
district courts are wasting time and money on fraudulent claims.180 
176. See supra Section II.C.
177. See supra Section II.C.2. 
178. Cf. Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, No. 2:12-CV-
2148-WMA, 2015 WL 1893471, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015) (citing Bermudez v. TRC
Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998)) (relying on Judge Easterbrook’s 
reasoning that applying a lesser causation standard at the prima facie stage would merely
prolong frivolous claims). 
179. See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013). The
third element of a prima facie retaliation claim requires that a causal relationship have 
existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment activity. See supra
note 11. Although not stated explicitly by any of the courts referenced in this Comment,
there is some indication that courts applying a but-for requirement at the prima facie stage 
drew from this causal relationship language that proof of but-for causation is required at 
the prima facie stage.
180. See id. Indeed, this fear may be well founded given the prolific rise of
retaliation claims over the last twenty years. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFO. & PLANNING,
supra note 4. Conversely, it may be indicative of a culture coming to grips with the
961






    
 
  
      
  
 
   
   
 








   
  
      
 
    
          
      
       
   
 
      
      
    
    
 
       
     
          
 
 
On the other hand, advocates of the pretext stage cite the Supreme 
Court’s worry in Burdine of overburdening the plaintiff at the prima facie 
stage and the need to preserve the traditional McDonnell Douglas
framework.181 According to the Fourth Circuit in Foster, and presumably
to the other circuits in this camp, applying the ultimate causation standard 
at the prima facie stage would be the same as eliminating the McDonnell 
Douglas framework altogether by limiting the use of pretext evidence to
those plaintiffs who do not need it.182 Requiring the plaintiff to prove but-
for causation at the prima facie stage would contradict the Supreme
Court’s ruling that the prima facie burden must not be onerous.183 
Further, the courts in Foster and Carvalho-Grevious argued that the
pretext stage already appears to be another label for but-for causation.184 
According to these courts, the ultimate burden of persuasion under McDonnell
Douglas already requires the plaintiff to establish “both that the employer’s
reason was false and that retaliation was the real reason for the challenged 
conduct.”185  As this Comment argues in the next section, this is a misperception 
of what the McDonnell Douglas framework ultimately proves and leads 
to the incorrect assumption that the pretext stage already effectively required
the plaintiff to meet Nassar’s but-for causation requirement. Nevertheless, 
the courts in this camp correctly deduced that applying the holding of 
Nassar to a prima facie case of retaliation would upend decades of McDonnell 
Douglas jurisprudence by placing a strong burden on the plaintiff’s initial
case, preventing meritorious claims from proceeding to the pretext stage, 
and rendering—in effect—the pretext stage redundant for plaintiffs with
strong enough cases to reach it. 
pervasive nature of discrimination and cognitive biases. See Zacharek, Dockterman 
& Edwards, supra note 1.
181. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). 
182. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.–E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (“If 
plaintiffs can prove but-for causation at the prima facie stage, they will necessarily be able
to satisfy their ultimate burden of persuasion without proceeding through the pretext 
analysis. Conversely, plaintiffs who cannot satisfy their ultimate burden of persuasion 
without the support of pretext evidence would never be permitted past the prima facie 
stage to reach the pretext stage.”).
183. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. The prima facie case is meant only to “eliminate[] 
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons” for the adverse action, thereby giving rise
to an inference of unlawful retaliatory motive. Id. at 253–54. 
184. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Foster, 787 F.3d at 252. 
185. Foster, 787 F.3d at 252 (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Wash. Coll., 57 F.3d 269, 278 
(4th Cir. 1995); see also Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258 (quoting Moore v. City of
Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006)). Such an assumption may be in violation of the
Supreme Court’s imperative not to conflate but-for causation with sole causation. See 
supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
962
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A.  Satisfying McDonnell Douglas Does Not Necessarily 
Establish But-For Causation
Although the courts that advocate for placing the burden at the pretext
stage present a convincing argument, a more thorough examination of
their interpretation of McDonnell Douglas reveals significant flaws. As
previously explained, the Nassar decision eliminated the motivating factor 
standard for proving causation in retaliation claims—first introduced in
Price Waterhouse and then codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.186  A
motivating factor, to reiterate, is one that has a tendency to bring about a
decision, but does not rise to the level of being necessary to that decision.187 
By contrast, a but-for factor is one in whose absence the decision would not
have occurred.188  While the  McDonnell Douglas framework forces  
employers to provide a reason for their actions, thereby giving plaintiffs a
tangible object to attack and discredit, it does not necessarily prove but-
for causation.189 
To see this, it is important to understand that McDonnell Douglas works
through a chain of inferences, rather than a process of elimination.  In
other words, “a plaintiff that successfully uses McDonnell Douglas to
186. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249, 259, 268–69, 276 (1989); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018) (establishing that a plaintiff must show that a protected 
characteristic was a “motivating factor” in the materially adverse decision); id. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (providing that once a plaintiff has shown a 2000e-2(m) violation, the defendant 
may demonstrate it would have taken the same action absent consideration of the protected 
characteristic). Whether such elimination was proper and required according to traditional
tort principles is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Kimberly A. Pathman,
Protecting Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision in the Wake of University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 475 (2015) (arguing for stopgap 
measures to protect employees from Nassar’s adverse effects, as well as a reinterpretation 
of but-for causation through modern tort law principles); Katherine Stark Todd, But-for
Nassar, There Would Not Be a Causation Conundrum in Title VII Retaliation Litigation:
How University  of Texas Southwest Medical  Center  v. Nassar  Makes It Harder for
Employees to Prevail, 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 288 (2016) (arguing that Nassar
improperly requires but-for causation at the prima facie stage); Matthew A. Krimski, Note,
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar: Undermining the National 
Policy Against Discrimination, 73 MD. L. REV. 132 (2014) (arguing that requiring but-for
causation undermines the national policy against discrimination). 
187. See supra Part II.A.2.
188. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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prove discrimination does not eliminate all nondiscriminatory reasons for 
the [alleged retaliatory] action.”190  Consider the following example: 
Suppose that in a race discrimination case the defendant claimed to have based
its decision to fire the plaintiff on two nondiscriminatory factors: poor performance 
on a project and excessive tardiness. And suppose that the plaintiff proves that
one of those reasons (poor performance on the project) was incorrect, but fails to
prove that the second reason (excessive tardiness) was incorrect; that is, suppose 
that the plaintiff was excessively tardy. Based on the fact that the first proffered
reason (poor performance) was erroneous, the factfinder might proceed down the
McDonnell Douglas chain of inferences to find discrimination. The factfinder
might find that the claim of poor performance was a lie, a cover-up, and designed
to conceal discrimination. But the factfinder might nevertheless conclude that 
the plaintiff was excessively tardy.191 
Thus, it is possible that a plaintiff can use McDonnell Douglas to prove 
retaliatory purpose by disproving a defendant’s given reason without 
disproving the employer’s other nonretaliatory purposes for the action.
In such a case, despite the fact that pretext has been proven, if the other
nonretaliatory reasons, standing by themselves, would have caused the
same decision, then the retaliatory purpose would not be a but-for cause.
Thus, the pretext camp reasoning—that the Nassar holding had no effect
on the pretext stage of McDonnell Douglas because the pretext stage
already required plaintiffs to prove that retaliation was the actual reason
for the challenged employment action—is based on a misunderstanding
of the framework’s mechanics.192 McDonnell Douglas does not work
through a process of elimination by which all other nondiscriminatory
reasons are eliminated, but rather through a series of inferences.193  The
factfinder can infer discrimination from the fact of the lie because when
someone attempts to cover something up, it can be inferred that they did
so to avoid liability. However, the problem is that this inference arises
whether the protected activity was a but-for cause or merely a motivating 
factor of the liar’s decision. The belief that an employer would not attempt
to hide a retaliatory motive if such a motive was not the reason for making
the adverse employment action is misplaced. A defendant is still incentivized 
190. Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 U. NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 
134 (2007). 
191. Id.
192. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir. 2017); 
Foster v. Univ. of Md.–E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015).  Indeed, both courts’
belief that the framework requires retaliation to be the real reason for the adverse action 
seems to go beyond just proving but-for cause, but also sole cause. 
193. Understanding this chain of inferences is essential to understanding the limits
of McDonnell Douglas. The pretext method of proof works through a chain of inferences
in which none of the links in the chain, standing alone, prove discrimination. Rather, it is
the entire chain of permissive inferences—from mistake, to lie, to cover-up, to discrimination 
—that proves discrimination. See Katz, supra note 190. 
964
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
to cover up a retaliatory motive even if the other factors might have
precipitated the same action, that is, even if the retaliatory motive was 
only a motivating factor. As the Supreme Court explained in St. Mary’s
Honor Center. v. Hicks, “rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons
will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination,” but not necessarily compel such a decision.194  Standing
alone, showing that a defendant’s proffered reason is false will not always 
be sufficient evidence of discrimination; pretext does not necessarily
prove but-for causation.
The fact that McDonnell Douglas does not necessarily prove but-for 
causation, however, does not mean that it is irrelevant. 
IV. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS’S SURVIVAL STORY
McDonnell Douglas does not specify a causal standard, despite what
the pretext camp suggests. In other words, the alternative methods—Price 
Waterhouse and the 1991 Act—specify causal standards—motivating
factor or but-for causation—McDonnell Douglas does not. Rather, it 
provides a method of proving causation.  The alternative methods merely
specified a causal standard—they did not provide a method of proving it. 
Under such an understanding, McDonnell Douglas could be used either in
a weak fashion to prove motivating factor or in a strong fashion to prove 
but-for causation. As it stands, the framework only necessarily proves 
motivating factor. Because but-for causation is now required, a strong 
version of McDonnell Douglas that actually proves such a causal standard
should also be required. 
Currently, McDonnell Douglas necessarily proves motivating factor 
causation, not but-for causation. As explained earlier, retaliatory animus
could be a motivating factor, but not also a but-for factor, if there is another
independently sufficient factor that motivated the employer’s action. If
the jury finds one of the reasons proffered by the employer was a lie and
that the employer indeed had a retaliatory reason to fire the employee, but 
the employee was such a terrible employee that the employer was going
to fire the employee anyway, then the second factor is independently
194. 509 U.S. 502, 508–11 (1993). This was in response to the Eighth Circuit setting
aside a determination in favor of the defendants because “once [the plaintiff] proved all of 
[the defendants’] proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions to be pretextual, 
[the plaintiff] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 508 (quoting Hicks v. 
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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sufficient and retaliation was a motivating factor, but not a but-for factor.
The employer would have made the same decision as a result of the second 
factor; thus, the retaliatory factor may not be a but-for cause.  Without
modification, the use of such a framework that does not necessarily prove 
but-for causation would be inappropriate in Nassar’s wake. 
However, because McDonnell Douglas does not specify a causal standard, 
but is instead merely a method of proving it, a strong version can be 
conceptualized by which to prove but-for causation. Rather than disproving
a single pretextual reason, a plaintiff using the strong version would be 
required to disprove all of the defendant’s proffered reasons. If the defendant
only proffered one alternative reason, proving it as a lie would invariably 
leave only the retaliatory reason as the but-for cause. Under this version 
of McDonnell Douglas, the factfinder must conclude that each of the 
defendant’s proffered reasons were pretext for retaliation. That is, the 
factfinder must believe that the proffered reasons were lies perpetrated to 
cover up the retaliation, not merely honest mistakes, or lies told for a 
harmless reason or to cover something up other than retaliation. In such
a case, the plaintiff will have proven but-for causation. 
Perhaps this is the version that the pretext camp is suggesting.  Such a
strong version would prove but-for causation as Nassar requires: all of the
defendant’s proffered reasons, as well as all of the inferences other than
retaliation that could have been drawn, will have been rejected.  No
independently sufficient factors would be possible, and retaliatory animus 
alone would remain as the but-for cause of the materially adverse action. 
However, while it is true that this strong version of McDonnell Douglas
does indeed prove but-for causation, it also goes further and proves the
sole cause. Eliminating the possibility of any other factor proffered by 
the defendant as pretext, a plaintiff would prove not only but-for cause but
also sole cause. The strong version proves the retaliatory factor as both a
necessary and sufficient factor. 
In their concurrence in Burrage, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
stressed that the words “because of” were not to be misconstrued as meaning 
“solely because of.”195 Thus, in shifting to a strong version to retain the
use of McDonnell Douglas, we are invariably forcing the plaintiff to 
prove too much—in direct contravention of the will of Congress and
the Supreme Court.
195. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 219 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 363, 383–85 (2013)). The
but-for causation standard does not require that retaliation be the sole cause of the action—
there can be multiple but-for causes—and retaliation need only be a but-for cause of the 
adverse action for the employee to prevail. Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 
846 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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The only way around this problem is to embrace it.  That is to say, yes, 
McDonnell Douglas does prove sole cause, but so what? As long as using 
the framework is optional and nobody is conflating sole cause with but-
for cause as warned against by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, it is still
a useful tool. Proving discriminatory causation is tough, and there are a
very few ways by which to do so. Maintaining McDonnell Douglas pretext
evidence—evidence that does not depend on any expensive statistics, 
unlikely admissions, overheard statements, or differently treated comparators 
—even if it requires plaintiffs to prove more than required, is still a boon 
to them. The framework forces employers to provide a reason for their 
actions, giving plaintiffs a tangible object to attack and discredit. It truly
is a benefit to plaintiffs, and its loss would result in one less way of 
accomplishing the challenging job of proving causation. The strong version 
laid out in this Comment may be less useful, but it still allows a plaintiff 
without direct evidence to prove that all of the defendant’s proffered
reasons are pretextual. In doing so, the plaintiff is proving sole cause, yes, 
but she is also proving the but-for causation required by Nassar.  The use
of anything less than this strong version of McDonnell Douglas would not 
meet Nassar’s causal requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
The causation standards for establishing a prima facie retaliation case 
and proving pretext are different. That is because the burden of establishing 
a prima facie case, and therefore a causal connection between retaliation
and the employer’s adverse employment action, is meant to be less onerous.  
As explained by the pretext camp, applying the ultimate causation standard,
but-for, at the prima facie stage would be tantamount to eliminating the
McDonnell Douglas framework in retaliation cases altogether. It would 
force plaintiffs to prove their ultimate case before they even get their cases
off the ground. Consequently and ironically, the only plaintiffs who could
make use of the pretext framework are those plaintiffs who do not need it.  
Any plaintiff that can prove but-for causation at the prima facie stage,
before a defendant has provided any evidence of non-retaliatory reasons 
for their decision, would do so through so-called direct methods of proof — 
incriminating statements that in and of themselves evince illicit, retaliatory 
intent. In these cases, pretext is beside the point. Those plaintiffs who 
cannot satisfy the ultimate burden of persuasion without the use of pretext 
evidence would never make it beyond the prima facie stage to reach the 
pretext stage. As the court in Foster highlighted, had the Supreme Court 
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intended to retire McDonnell Douglas entirely, thereby setting aside forty
years of precedent, it would have spoken plainly and clearly to that effect.
But it did not do so.
Nothing the Court said in the Nassar suggests that McDonnell Douglas
is dead.  Nothing the Court says in Nassar alters the causation prong of a 
prima facie case of retaliation, either. According to the traditional application
of the framework, the causal standard of the prima facie case is different than
and less than a plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion. While it is not
true that the pretext method of proof—best envisioned as a series of permissive
inferences—necessarily proves but-for causation, implementation of the
strong version of McDonnell Douglas does. Such a strong version would 
eliminate all independently sufficient factors by requiring the factfinder 
to conclude that each of the defendant’s proffered reasons were pretext  
for retaliation. Should the Supreme Court decide to resolve the current 
circuit split as to whether Nassar affects the prima facie stage or the 
pretext stage, it should place the burden at the pretext stage and allow for 
the strong version of the framework only to survive.
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